Slides for Mba E Business Essay Example

Slides for Mba E Business Essay PIDE Working Papers 2010: 57 Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Corporate Valuation, Ownership and Financing Attiya Y. Javid Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad and Robina Iqbal Freelance Researcher PAKISTAN INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ISLAMABAD All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise—without prior permission of the Publications Division, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, P. O. Box 1091, Islamabad 44000. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2010. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics Islamabad, Pakistan E-mail: [emailprotected] org. pk Website: http://www. pide. org. pk Fax: +92-51-9248065 Designed, composed, and finished at the Publications Division, PIDE. CONTENTS Pages Abstract Chapter 1. Introduction 1. 1 Background 1. 2 Objectives of the Study 1. 3 Organisation of the Study Chapter 2. Overview of Corporate Governance in Pakistan 2. 1 Introduction 2. 2 Institutional Framework 2. 3 Code of the Corporate Governance 2. 4 Assessment of Corporate Governance 2. 5 Corporate Governance under Concentrated Ownership 2. Corporate Governance in South Asia 2. 7 Summary and Conclusion Chapter 3. Determinants of Corporate Governance 3. 1 Introduction 3. 2 Review of Previous Literature 3. 3 Corporate Governance Index 3. 4 Determinants of Corporate Governance 3. 5 Estimation Technique 3. 6 Empirical Findings 3. 7 Summary and Conclusion Chapter 4. Corporate Governance and Corporate Valuation 4. 1 Introduction 4. 2 Review of Previous Empirical Literature 4. 3 Data and Methodological Framework 4. 4 Empirical Findings 4. 5 Summary and Conclusion vii 1 1 3 4 4 4 5 9 10 12 13 16 16 16 17 18 20 21 22 24 25 25 26 29 31 36 Pages Chapter 5. Corporate Governance and Corporate Ownership 5. 1 Introduction 5. 2 Review of Previous Literature 5. 3 Data and Methodological Framework 5. 4 Empirical Findings 5. 5 Summary and Conclusion Chapter 6. Corporate Governance and External Financing 6. 1 Introduction 6. 2 Review of Previous Literature 6. 3 Data and Methodological Framework 6. 4 Empirical Evidence 6. 5 Summary and Conclusion Chapter 7. Conclusion Appendi ces References List of Tables Table 2. 1 Table 2. 2 Table 2. 3 Table 2. 4 Table 2. 5 Table 2. 6 Table 2. 7 Table 2. 8 Table 2. 9 Table 3. 1 Table 3. 2 Table 4. Year Wise Distribution of Companies Provincial Wise Distribution of Companies Capitalisation Break Down for the Year 2007 KSE Performance at Glance Ownership Concentration of 50 Random Companies for Pakistan for 2003-2007 Inventors Composition in Listed Private Companies Ownership Composition of Pakistan’s Top 40 Listed Companies Basic Statistics of Corporate Sector of India Types of Financial Institutions in Bangladesh Summary Statistics of Corporate Governance Index Evidence on Determinants of Corporate Governance Evidence on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Tobin Q) 8 8 9 9 12 13 13 15 15 15 22 23 33 60 62 64 64 69 72 37 37 39 45 48 55 55 55 Table 2. 10 Dhaka Stock Exchange Select Statistics Pages Table 4. 2 Table 4. 3 Table 5. 1 Table 5. 2. 1 Table 5. 2. 2 Table 5. 3. 1 Table 5. 3. 2 Table 5. 3. 3 Table 5. 4 Table 6. 1 Table 6. Evidence on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (ROA) Evidence on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (D/P) Determinants of Concentration of Ownership by Top Five Shareholders Relation between Tobin Q and Ownership by Top Five Shareholders Relation between ROA and Ownership by Top Five Shareholders Evidence on Performance and Ownership Identity Evidence on Performance and Ownership Identity Evidence on Performance and Ownership Identity Evidence on Performance and Manager-Ownership Determinants of External Financing throu gh Equity Evidence on Firm Performance and Need of External Finance 33 34 49 51 51 53 53 54 55 62 63 69 70 71 Table A1 Corporate Governance Index (CGI) Components Table A2 Description of Variables Table A3 List of Companies ABSTRACT In this study the relationship between corporate governance and corporate valuation, ownership structure and need of external financing for the Karachi Stock Market is examined for the period 2003 to 2008. We will write a custom essay sample on Slides for Mba E Business specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on Slides for Mba E Business specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on Slides for Mba E Business specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer To measure the firmlevel governance a rating system is used to evaluate the stringency of a set of governance practices and cover various governance categories: such as board composition, ownership and shareholdings and transparency, disclosure and auditing. The sample consists of 60 non-financial firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange and comprises more than 80 percent of market capitalization at Karachi Stock Market in 2007. The results confirms the theoretical notion that firms with better investment opportunities and larger in size adopt better corporate governance practice. The proposition that ownership concentration is a response to poor legal protection is also validated by the results. The more investment opportunities lead to more concentration of ownership and the ownership concentration is significantly diluted as the firm size expands. The findings are consistent with theoretical argument claiming that family owners, foreign owners and bring better governance and monitoring practices which is consistent with agency theory. The results suggest that firms which need more equity financing practice good governance. The results show that firms with high growth and large in size are in more need of external finance. The relationship between external financing and ownership concentration is negative. The results reveal that the firms which practice good governance, with concentrated ownership, need more external finance which have more profitable investment opportunities and are larger in size are valued higher. The interaction term of any variable with law enforcement term are not significant in any model suggesting that firm performance is not affected by rule of law in countries where legal environment is weak. These results adds an important link to the explanation of the consequences weak legal environment for external financing, corporate valuation and corporate governance. The results show that Corporate Governance Code 2002 potentially improves the governance and decision making process of firms listed at KSE. JEL classification: G3 F3 Keywords: Ownership Concentration, Corporate Governance, Firm Performance, External Financing, Panel Data Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION* 1. 1. Background Good corporate governance contributes to sustainable economic development by enhancing the performance of companies and increasing their access to outside capital. In emerging markets good corporate governance serves a number of public policy objectives. It reduces vulnerability of the financial crises, reinforcement property rights; reduces transaction cost and cost of capital and leads to capital market development. Corporate governance concerns the relationship among the management, board of directors, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. In Pakistan, the publication of the SECP Corporate Governance Code 2002 for publicly listed companies has made it an important area of research of corporate sector. A corporate governance system is comprised of a wide range of practices and institutions, from accounting standards and laws concerning financial disclosure, to executive compensation, to size and composition of corporate boards. A corporate governance system defines who owns the firm, and dictates the rules by which economic returns are distributed among shareholders, employees, managers, and other stakeholders. As such, a countys corporate governance regime has deep implications for firm organisation, employment systems, trading relationships, and capital markets. Thus, changes in Pakistani system of corporate governance are likely to have important consequences for the structure and conduct of country business. In its broadest sense, corporate governance refers to a complementary set of legal, economic, and social institutions that protect the interests of a corporation’s owners. In the Anglo-American system of corporate governance these owners are shareholders. The concept of corporate governance presumes a fundamental tension between shareholders and corporate managers [Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. While the objective of a corporation’s shareholders is a return on their investment, managers are likely to have other goals, such as the power and prestige of running a large and powerful organisation, or entertainment and other perquisites of their position. In this situation, managers’ superior access to inside information and the relatively Acknowledgements: The authors are Professor of Economics, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad and freelance researcher respectively. The authors wish to thank Dr Rashid Amjad, Dr Tariq Javed and Dr Idrees Khawaja for their valuable comments. They are grateful to Hafeez Ahmed and Shahab-u-Din for providing assistance in compiling data and Yasir Iqbal for computer assistance. Any remaining errors and omissions are the authors’ sole responsibility. 2 powerless position of the numerous and dispersed shareholders, mean that managers are likely to have the upper hand. The researchers have offered a number of solutions for this agency problem between shareholders and managers which fall under the categories of incentive alignment, monitoring, and discipline. Incentives of managers and shareholders can be aligned through practices such as stock options or other market-based compensation [Fama and Jensen (1983a)]. Monitoring by an independent and engaged board of directors assures that managers behave in the best interests of the shareholders [Fama and Jensen (1983)]. Chief Executive Officer (CEO)’s who fail to maximise shareholder interests can be removed by concerned boards of directors, and a firm that neglects shareholder value is disciplined by the market through hostile takeover1 [Jensen and Ruback (1983)]. The code of corporate governance introduced by SECP in early 2002 is the major step in corporate governance reforms in Pakistan. The code includes many recommendations in line with international good practice. The major areas of enforcement include reforms of board of directors in order to make it accountable to all shareholders and better disclosure including improved internal and external audits for listed companies. However, the code’s limited provisions on director’s independence remain voluntary and provide no guidance on internal controls, risk management and board compensation policies. The main focus of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance, corporate ownership, corporate financing for publicly listed Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) firms. Therefore, we attempt to identify the relationship between corporate governance proxies and firm value in our sample of KSE firms. This emphasises the importance of legal rules and the quality of their enforcement. In Pakistan, with traditionally low dispersion of ownership, the primary methods to solve agency problems are the legal protection of minority investors, the use of boards as monitors of senior management, and an active market for corporate control. In contrast to developed markets in Pakistan corporate governance is characterised by lesser reliance on capital markets and outside investors, but stronger reliance on large inside investors and financial institutions to achieve efficiency in the corporate sector. In this case, outside (smaller) investors face the risk of expropriation in the form of wealth transfers to larger shareholders. According to Shliefer and Vishny (1997) corporate governance mechanisms are economic and legal institutions that can be altered through the political process. As regards governance reform, product market competition would force firms to minimise costs, and as part of this cost minimisation to adopt rules, including corporate governance mechanisms, enabling them to raise external capital at the lowest cost in the long run. On this evolutionary theory of A takeover which goes against the wishes of the target company’s management and board of directors. 1 economic change [Alchian (1950); Stigler (1958)], competition would take care of corporate governance. Corporate governance in agency theory perspective is referred to as separation of ownership and control [Barle and Means (1932)]. There are two most common approaches to corporate governance to protec t investors’ rights. First approach is to give investors power through legal protection from expropriation by managers. Protection of minority rights and legal prohibitions against managerial self-dealing are examples of such mechanisms. The second major approach is ownership by large investors (concentrated ownership): matching significant cash flow rand control rights. Most corporate governance mechanisms used in the world-including large share holdings, relationship banking, and even takeovers- can be viewed as examples of large investors exercising their power. We discuss how large investors reduce agency costs. While large investors still rely on the legal system, they do not need as many rights as the small investors do to protect their interests. For this reason, corporate governance is typically exercised by large investors. Despite its common use, concentrated ownership has its costs as well, which can be best described as potential expropriation by large investors of other small investors and stakeholders in the firm [Shliefer and Vishny (1997)]. 1. 2. Objective of the Study The main focus of the study is to investigate does corporate governance matters in Pakistan equity market? What are its implications for corporate valuation, corporate, ownership and corporate financing? The first dimension of this issue is measuring the corporate governance in Pakistan. Corporate governance is interpreted as mechanism–both institutional and market based, that induces the self-interested managers (controllers of the firm) to make decisions that maximise the value of the firm to its shareholders (owners of the firm) [OECD (1999)]. The aim of these mechanisms is to reduce agency costs that arise from principle agent problem; and they could be internal and/or external in nature [Klapper and Love (2002)]. Internal mechanism deals with the composition of the board of directors, such as proportion of independent outside directors, distinction of CEO and chairperson etc. another important mechanism is ownership structure, or the degree at which the ownership by managers obvious trade-off between alignment and entrenchment effects. External mechanism on the other hand rely on takeover market in addition to regulatory system, where as the take over market act as a treat to existing controllers in that it enable outsiders to seek control of the firm if bad corporate governance results in significant gap between potential and actual value of the firm. So given these mechanisms, it is investigated that the legal system is the only way to ensure good corporate governance. It is also examined that effective presence of these mechanisms positively associated with firm value. 4 The second dimension of this issue is to investigate the determinants of concentrated form of ownership structure in Pakistan and its affect on firm performance. The reason is that when the legal framework does not offer sufficient protection for the outside investors, entrepreneurs and original owners are forced to maintain large position in their companies which results in concentrated form of ownership [La Porta, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999)]. The third dimension of this study is to assess the determinants of firms to raise external finance through equity and to examine that the firms that rely more on external financing sources are performing better. 1. 3. Organisation of the Study Rest of the study is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides overview of corporate governance in Pakistan and it also discuses the data used in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 measures the corporate governance by using 22 factors which constructs aggregate corporate governance index, and this index is divided in to three sub-indices. This chapter also discusses the determinants of corporate governance in Pakistan. In Chapter 5, the determinants of ownership structure are explored. The effect of ownership structure with firm performance is also investigated. The identity of owners is then related to firm value. In the Chapter 6 examines the factors that influence the need of external finance in Pakistan and its effect on firm value. Chapter 7 concludes the study. Chapter 2: OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN 2. 1. Introduction Corporate governance matters for the financial development by increasing the flow of capital to the capital market. East Asian financial crisis attract serious attention to importance of corporate governance in developing countries. The OECD has established a set of corporate governance principles in 1999 that have become the core template for assessing a country’s corporate governance arrangements. La Porta, et al. (2000) Defined, â€Å"Corporate governance is, to a certain extent, a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders. † They define â€Å"the insiders† as both managers and controlling shareholders. â€Å"Corporate governance comprises the private and public institutions (both formal and informal) which together govern the relationship between those who manage corporations and those who invest resources in corporations. These institutions typically include a country’s corporate laws, securities regulations, stock-market listing requirements, accepted business practices and prevailing business ethics† [Omran (2004)]. Thus, changes in Pakistani system of corporate 5 governance are likely to have important consequences for the structure and conduct of country business. The issue of Corporate Governance of banks has also fundamental importance for emerging Economies. SBP restructured the regulatory framework governing the commercial banking industry and issued some guidelines for corporate governance. The study of Kalid and Hanif (2005) provides an overview of development in the banking sector and measures of corporate governance in Pakistan. Their study observes that SBP rganised its role as a regulator and supervisor and make the central bank relatively more effectively in recent years. Moreover, the legal and regulatory structure governing the role and functions of commercial banks has b een restructured. However, as the process of corporate governance of banks in Pakistan is very recent, not enough information is available to make an assessment of the impact of these policies such as an evaluation of the improvement in bank efficiency or reduction in bank defaults. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan issued Code of Corporate Governance in March 2002 in order to strengthen the regulatory mechanism and its enforcement. The code of corporate governance is the major step in corporate governance reforms in Pakistan. The code includes many recommendations in line with international good practice. The major areas of enforcement include reforms of board of directors in order to make it accountable to all shareholders and better disclosure including improved internal and external audits for listed companies. However, the code’s limited provisions on director’s independence remain voluntary and provide no guidance on internal controls, risk management and board compensation policies. The plan of the chapter is as follows. The institutional framework is presented in Section 2. Section 3 briefly reviews the code of corporate governance of Pakistan. The assessment of the code of corporate governance is provided in Section 4. Section 5 explores corporate governance under ownership structure of Pakistan. Section 6 concludes our discussion. 2. 2. Institutional Framework East Asian financial crisis and corporate failure like Enron have brought to light the importance of an effective institutional framework. In order to the improve value of the corporate governance for finance development of a country attention must be given to strengthen the institutional framework. That strong institutional framework would help in effective corporate management and for developing advanced capital markets that increases shareholder value and enhance corporate governance. The establishment of the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan represents an important milestone in the development of the regulatory framework of the capital market in Pakistan. The S ecurities and Exchange 6 Commission of Pakistan (The Commission) was established in pursuance of the Securities and Exchanges Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 and became operational on 1st January, 1999. It succeeds the Corporate Law Authority (CLA), which was a Government department attached to the Ministry of finance. It was initially concerned with the regulation of corporate sector and capital market. In accordance with the approved Corporate Plan, the Commission has been organised into the following six Divisions: †¢ †¢ †¢ †¢ †¢ †¢ Company Law Division. Securities Market Division. Specialised Companies Division. Finance and Admin Division. Human Resource and Training Division. Insurance Division. Each of division is divided into Departments and Wings for effective administration. The Departments are headed by Executive Directors, with oversight by commissioners. 2 The continuing challenges of the Commission include: based on the regulatory principles develop a modern and efficient corporate sector and capital market; based on international legal standards. In order to foster principles of good governance in the corporate sector and protect investors through responsive policy measure and enforcement practice develop an efficient and dynamic regulatory body. The SECP is governed by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 which encompasses the constitution of the Commission appointment and terms and conditions of the Chairman and Commissioners, functions and powers of the Commission and financial arrangements. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan is administering many laws. These includes: insurance Ordinance, 2000 (previously as Insurance Act, 1938; The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act,1997; The company ordinance, 1984 (amended and implemented in 2002); The Modaraba Companies and Modaraba (Floatation and Control) Ordinance, 1980; The Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969. The Policy Board is established by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 in order to provide guidance to the Commission in all matters relating to the functions of the Commission and formulation of the policies. The Policy Board consists of maximum nine members appointed by the Federal Government. Out of nine members five members would be as ex-officio members and five members would be from private sector. See official website of securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan for detail; www. secp. org. pk. 2 7 A number of significant amendments in corporate laws were made with the objective of updating these laws to keep pace with developments in the corporate sector. These include: amendm ents in Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969; Modaraba Companies and Modaraba (floatation and control) Ordinance, 1980; Companies Ordinance, 1984; the securities and exchange commission of Pakistan Act, 1997. Amendments in company ordinance, 1984, suggested by the SECP have been approved by the cabinet in 2002. The amendments mainly relates to incorporation of single member company. Because of this amendment an individual trader or manufacturer would be able to establish a company having its own separate entity and thus enjoying the privilege of limited liability. This new concept will help for expansion of a discipline corporate sector. The companies have been provided the period of four months in order to present audited account before shareholders. The private companies which convert into public companies after one year of their incorporation have been exempted to hold their statutory meetings. The new amendments make it compulsory that copies of minutes of meetings will be provided to every director within 14 days of the date of such meetings. Appointment of a whole time qualified company secretary by a listed company has been made mandatory for efficient corporate compliance. Through these new amendments a company may remove its auditors through special resolution mean by the majority of 75 percent. However, appointment of new auditors in place of removed auditors will be made with the approval of the Commission. Quorum of a general meeting of a public listed company has been increased from three members to ten members present in person representing not less than 25 percent of total voting power. Stock markets are important as a source of investment finance for corporations in developing countries. At present, three stock exchanges are functioning in Pakistan, namely Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), Lahore Stock Exchange (LSE) and Islamabad Stock Exchange (ISE). Trading on all the three stock exchanges is fully automated (for performance see Table 2. 4). The three stock exchanges are also linked to the Central Depository System (CDS). Since the last decade, the capital markets of Pakistan have witnessed a substantial growth leading to a manifold increase in the trading volume. The custody and safe keeping of physical certificates required maintenance of huge vaults by the individuals and institutions and the physical settlement of certificates was no longer feasible. Moreover, the manual system was also plagued by lengthy delays, risks of damage, forgeries and considerable time and capital investment. Central Depository Company of Pakistan Limited (CDC) was incorporated in 1993 and subsequently became operational in 1997 to manage and operate the Central Depository System (CDS). CDS is an electronic book entry system to record and transfer securities. Electronic book entry means that the securities do not physically change hands and the transfer from one client account to another takes place electronically. CDC provides the backbone for smooth and efficient settlement operations of the Pakistani capital market. Almost all of the total settlement of the stock exchanges is now done through the CDS. 3 To encourage corporate governance the institute of corpora te governance of Pakistan a non-profit organisation is established under Section 42 of company ordinance, 1984. It is public private partnership. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan, three stock exchanges and banking and insurance institutions are founding members of this institution. In 2006 PICG in collaboration with IFC and State Bank of Pakistan conducted a conference of banking reforms in Pakistan. The conference aspired to create increased understanding of the need for good governance among Pakistan’s banking sector. Charged Table 2. 1 Year Wise Distribution of Companies Financial Year 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 Incorporated Companies 968 1074 1169 1183 1553 2207 3078 6186 4703 No. of Equity Issue to Public (Rs bill) 0. 44 0. 00 2. 03 1. 99 5. 97 0. 98 48. 88 24. 34 9. 60 Source: Annual Report of SECP 2006-07. Table 2. 2 Provincial Wise Distribution of Companies 2005 2006 Province / Territory (% Share) (% Share) Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan Islamabad Territory 43 39 11 1 6 39 29 9 4 19 2007 (% Share) 46 34 6 1 13 Source: Annual Report of SECP 2005, 2006, 2007. 3 See official website of CDC www. CDCPakistan. com. 9 Table 2. 3 Capitalisation Break Down for the Year 2007 Listed Com Paid Up Capital (Rs) Up to 10,000 1 100,000 to 500,000 1 500,001to1,000,000 0 1,000,001 to 10,000,000 34 10,000,000 to 100,000,000 226 1000,000,001 to 500,000,000 236 500,000,001 to 1,000,000,000 45 1,000,000,001 and above 69 Source: Annual Report of SECP 2007. Unlisted Private Public Com Com 448 20,607 343 7,037 105 4,566 343 10,804 662 3,168 224 319 32 29 36 18 SMCs 373 100 59 48 28 2 0 0 Total 24,429 7,481 4,730 11,229 4,084 799 106 123 Percentage 42. 87 14. 97 9. 46 22. 47 8. 17 1. 60 0. 21 0. 25 Table 2. KSE Performance at Glance 2004 KSE 100 Index 5,279. 18 Market Capitalisation (Rs bill) 1,421. 58 Turnover (Shares Mill) 389 Source: Annual Report of SECP 2004,2005,2006,2007. 2005 7,450. 12 2,068. 19 343 2006 9,981. 40 2,801. 28 321. 10 2007 13,772. 26 4,019. 46 367. 96 2. 3. Code of the Corporate Governance Many new financial instruments are introduced by the SECP in order to enhance corporate governance. The code of corporate governance was issued in March 2002 by the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan in order to improve transparency, governance and protect the interest of the investors by improving the disclosure in financial reporting of companies. The Code of Corporate Governance is the results of the joint effort of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and Chartered of Pakistan in collaboration with Institute of Cost and Management Accountants of Pakistan (ICMAP) and three Stock Exchanges. The code includes many recommendations in line with international good practice. All listed companies publish and circulate a statement along with their annual reports to set out the status of their compliance with the best practices of corporate governance. The Code primarily aims to establish a system whereby a company is directed and controlled by its directors in compliance with the best practice so as to safeguard the interest of diversified stakeholders. It proposes to restructure the composition of the board of directors in order to introduce broad based representation by minority shareholders and by executive and nonexecutive directors. 4 ’5 The Code emphasised openness and transparency in 4 All listed companies shall encourage effective representation of independent non-executive directors, including those representing minority interest, on their Boards of Directors so that the Board as a group include core competencies considered relevant in the context of each listed company (Clause (i) of Code of Corporate governance, 2002). 5 Implementation of the clause of non-executive directors is voluntary not mandatory. 0 corporate affairs and the decision making process and requires directors to discharge their fiduciary responsibilities in the larger interest of all stakeholders in a transparent, informed, diligent, and timely manner. The salient feature of the Code includes setting up of audit committees and internal audit funct ions by all listed companies [Code of Corporate Governance (2002)]. In August 2002 SECP launch a project on corporate governance in collaboration with UNDP and Economic Affairs Division of Government of Pakistan. This project is launched mainly for the implementation of code of corporate governance and strong regulatory frame work for the corporate sector in Pakistan. In 2007 the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, International Financial Corporation (IFC) and Institute of Corporate G overnance of Pakistan (PINCG) conducted a Survey on â€Å"Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan†. The survey targeted the local listed and large local non-listed companies and financial sector institutions. Among the key findings in the survey, a major one is the need for creating awareness amongst the directors of companies about the benefits of the Code, so that they could go further than the tick-box approach to implementing the Code, and understand and implement the Code in its true spirit. Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan developed a board development series (BDS) with the help of IFC. PICG conducted many workshops for the purpose of understanding corporate governance and responsibilities of boards of directors. 2. 4. Assessment of Corporate Governance The SECP is enforcing corporate governance regulations SECP is receiving technical assistance from Asian Development Bank to improve corporate governance enforcement programme and also from World Bank is build awareness and training. Other elements of enforcement regime are not so strong ICAP has some self regulatory function and stock exchanges are lacked the resources and expertise to effective monitor implementation of the code. Karachi Stock Exchange has set up a Board Committee on the Code of Corporate Governa

How Stock Market Prices Are Determined

How Stock Market Prices Are Determined At a very basic level, economists know that stock prices are determined by the supply of and demand for them, and stock prices adjust to keep supply and demand in balance (or equilibrium).  At a deeper level, however, stock prices are set by a combination of factors that no analyst can consistently understand or predict.  A number of economic models assert that stock prices  reflect the long-term earning potential of companies (and, more specifically, the projected growth path of stock dividends). Investors are attracted to stocks of companies they expect will earn substantial profits in the future; because many people wish to buy stocks of such companies, prices of these stocks tend to rise. On the other hand, investors are reluctant to purchase stocks of companies that face bleak earnings prospects; because fewer people wish to buy and more wish to sell these stocks, prices fall. When deciding whether to purchase or sell stocks, investors consider the general business climate and outlook, the financial condition and prospects of the individual companies in which they are considering investing, and whether stock prices relative to earnings already are above or below traditional norms. Interest rate trends also influence stock prices significantly. Rising interest rates tend to depress stock prices - partly because they can foreshadow a general slowdown in economic activity and corporate profits, and partly because they lure investors out of the stock market and into new issues of interest-bearing investments (i.e. bonds of both the corporate and Treasury varieties). Falling rates, conversely, often lead to higher stock prices, both because they suggest easier borrowing and faster growth and because they make new interest-paying investments less attractive to investors. Other Factors That Determine Prices A number of other factors complicate matters, however. For one thing, investors generally buy stocks according to their expectations about the unpredictable future, not according to current earnings. Expectations can be influenced by a variety of factors, many of them not necessarily rational or justified. As a result, the short-term connection between prices and earnings can be tenuous. Momentum also can distort stock prices. Rising prices typically woo more buyers into the market, and the increased demand, in turn, drives prices higher still. Speculators often add to this upward pressure by purchasing shares in the expectation they will be able to sell them later to other buyers at even higher prices. Analysts describe a continuous rise in stock prices as a bull market. When speculative fever can no longer be sustained, prices start to fall. If enough investors become worried about falling prices, they may rush to sell their shares, adding to downward momentum. This is called a bear market. This article is adapted from the book Outline of the U.S. Economy by Conte and Carr and has been adapted with permission from the U.S. Department of State.